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The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 19861 (IRCA or Act)
consists of a series of delicate compromises designed to stop the flow of
illegal immigration into the United States. Two major considerations in-
fluenced Congress to reform the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).'
First, legislators and their constituents believed that the presence of large
numbers of undocumented workers in this country adversely affected the
terms of employment for authorized workers3 in the United States.4 Sec-
ond, reform proponents argued that the United States had lost control of
1. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in
scattered sections of 8, 7, 26 42 and 50 U.S.C.).
2. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
3. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) authorizes the employment of various cate-
gories of non-citizens, which include, inter alia: lawful permanent resident aliens, aliens admitted or
paroled into the United States as refugees, aliens admitted as nonimmigrant fiancs or fiancCes, for-
eign government officials, employees of foreign government officials, and nonimmigrant visitors. Em-
ployment Authorization, 8 C.F.R. § 109.1(a) (1986). In addition, some classes of aliens may be eligi-
ble to work, provided that they have applied for and received authorization for employment from the
INS. Id., § 109.1(b) (1986).
4. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1985) [hereinafter S. REP. 132] (adverse
impact of undocumented workers includes both unemployment and less favorable wages and working
conditions); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 1512 Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration, Refugee and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 964 (testimony of Rep. Coelho) ("With unemployment exceeding 10%, the American
people are demanding that we impose. . . control over immigration."); Legalization of Illegal Immi-
grants: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Senate Hearings] (testimony of Doris
Meissner, Acting Commissioner, INS) ("[M]igrants do useful work. . . but also compete with or at
least affect adversely the wages and working conditions of some American workers in some occupa-
tions and locations.").
For a discussion of the competing theories regarding the effect of illegal immigration on the work-
place in the United States, see Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 1200
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 72 [hereinafter 1985 Senate Hearings] (Attachment A to statement of Raul Yzaguirre, Na-
tional Council of La Raza). According to one school of thought, employment of illegal aliens results in
widespread displacement of legal workers. Those in the opposing school argue that the labor market is
segmented, with undocumented workers taking only those jobs legal workers refuse to perform. See
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/PEMD-88-13BR, INFLUENCE OF ILLEGAL ALENS
ON WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF LEGAL WORKERS 19, 27 (1988) [hereinafter GAO, IN-
FLUENCE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS]; see also Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a
Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REv. 615, 630-38 (1981) (comparing theories re-
garding impact of employment of aliens).
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its borders and that the influx of large numbers of illegal immigrants
threatened national sovereignty.5
Congress hoped to achieve its goal of immigration reform through legal-
ization, employer sanctions, and increased enforcement at United States
borders. 6 Legalization, which adjusted the status of undocumented aliens
already living and working in the United States, was intended to reduce
the size of a large and vulnerable underclass.' Applicants for legalization
who could prove they had resided in the United States since before Janu-
ary 1, 1982 qualified to apply for temporary, and later permanent, resi-
dent status.8
Proponents of employer sanctions argued that the elimination of jobs
attracting undocumented aliens would stop the flow of illegal immigra-
tion.9 The sanctions include civil and criminal penalties for the knowing
employment of unauthorized workers.10 In order to avoid sanctions, em-
ployers must verify employment eligibility for all persons hired after No-
vember 6, 1986.11
This Note focuses on the effect of immigration reform on the employ-
5. H.R. REP. No. 682, pt. 1, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5649, 5650 [hereinafter 1985 H.R. REP. 682] (quoting testimony of Attorney General
Edwin Meese III at the 1985 Hearings on H.R. 3080 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refu-
gees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No.
28 at 4). See also 132 CONG. Rac. H9710 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Rodino); 131
CONG. REC. S11,265 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1985) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
6. The IRCA includes increased appropriations for the INS, which enforces the nation's immigra-
tion laws. Congress authorized additional appropriations for the INS of $422 million for fiscal year
1987 and $419 million for 1988. IRCA § 111(b)(1). Despite the congressional authorization, Presi-
dent Reagan requested only an additional $138 million for 1987 and $122.8 million for 1988 for
enforcement. 64 INTERPRETER RELEAsES 29, 30 (Jan. 12, 1987).
7. SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND THE NATIONAL INTEREsT 72 (1981) [hereinafter U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY]. For a discussion
of the origins of the Select Commission, see infra note 27 .
Cf. S. REP. 132, supra note 4, at 16 (one purpose of legalization was to eliminate "a fearful and
clearly exploitable group within the United States society").
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (Supp. IV 1986). Applicants for legalization had to show means of financial
support. They were also excludable, as are other immigrants, for reasons enumerated in the INA, §
241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1982). The legalization application period ended May 4, 1988.
9. See, e.g., S. REP. 132, supra note 4, at I (primary incentive for illegal immigration is availabil-
ity of employment in United States); Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments: Hearings
on H.R. 3080 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 House Hearings] (testimony
of Attorney General Edwin Meese III):
Much illegal immigration is caused by the easy entry of illegal immigrants into jobs that are
very attractive when compared to employment opportunities in their homelands. Through a
provision making it illegal to knowingly hire aliens who lack authorization to work in the
United States, this problem can be addressed effectively.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (Supp. IV 1986). Prior to the IRCA, although unlawfully present immi-
grants committed a crime by entering the country, employers could hire the same immigrants without
breaking the law. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982). IRCA repealed this provision, known as the Texas
proviso. With the passage of the Act, an employer is subject to a civil penalty from $250 to $2000 for
a first violation, from $2000 to 55000 for a second violation, and up to $10,000 for any subsequent
violations. Control of Employment of Aliens, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10 (1988). Those who engage in a
pattern or practice of employing unauthorized aliens are subject to criminal penalties of up to 33000
for each unauthorized alien, imprisonment for up to six months, or both. Id.
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
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ment rights of one subclass of undocumented workers,12 those who arrived
in the United States after January 1, 1982, the Act's legalization eligibil-
ity date, but prior to November 6, 1986, the Act's effective date.1 3 Some
members of this subclass have children who are United States citizens,
family members who are legal residents, and strong community ties. Con-
sequently, many immigrants in this subclass have not left the United
States although they are unable to adjust their status.1 4 When it passed
the Act, Congress failed to consider adequately the large numbers of un-
documented persons who would remain in the United States despite the
implementation of employer sanctions, 5 and the impact of the presence of
such a class on the enforcement of employment laws in the United States.
Unauthorized employees in the 1982-1986 subclass find themselves in a
particularly vulnerable position relative to both legalized aliens and post-
12. The new law is expected to affect employment rights of all workers and increase labor and
employment litigation. Kobdish, The Frank Amendment to the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986-A Labyrinth for Labor Law Litigators, 41 Sw. L.J. 667 passim (1987); Ross, Simpson-
Rodino: A Closer Look, CAL. LAW., Apr. 1987, at 51. Authorized workers receive some protection
from IRCA's anti-discrimination provisions. See infra text accompanying notes 67-76.
13. Estimates vary as to the number of immigrants who entered after 1982 but began working
before November 6, 1986. Passel, Undocumented Immigration, 487 ANNALS 181, 184 n.2 (Sept.
1986). See also Braun & Hernandez, Amnesty's Long Term Impact Still Not Clear, L.A. Times,
Nov. 15, 1987, at 1, col. 3. The INS originally told Congress that it expected up to 3.9 million
legalization applicants. The Alien Amnesty Deadline Should be Extended, Christian Sci. Monitor,
Apr. 11, 1988, at 12, col. 1. In July, immigration officials reported that 2.5 million applied for
legalization. 2.5 Million Seek Amnesty, L.A. Times, July 11, 1988, at 2, col. 6. Most.of these immi-
grants plan to stay in the United States, and remain in the labor market. Hoffman, 40 Percent Not
Seeking Citizenship, Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 20, 1987, at A-22, col. 1.
14. Arocha, Illegal Immigrants Decide to Stay Put, Wash. Post, July 11, 1988, at Dl, col. 6. See
also Kamiya & Kalka, Immigrants' Fear Heightens Today, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1987, at A23, col. 1
("Few undocumented people will have the option of returning to their home countries, which they left
because of poverty, war and repression, and a desire to seek a better life in the United States-at any
cost."). See also Corchado & Solis, Immigration Law Creates a Subclass of Illegals Bound to Their
Bosses and Vulnerable to Abuses, Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1987, at 44, col. 1 (aliens present in United
States at time of IRCA's passage who do not qualify for legalization face depressed wages and sub-
standard working conditions).
An economic analysis illustrates why the 1982-1986 subclass would find it beneficial to remain in
the United States. The decision to migrate to the United States reflects the fact that the anticipated
difference in wages outweighs the costs of immigration (migration costs plus job search costs). D.
NORTH & R. MILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC ISSUES 124 (5th ed. 1980). Members of this
subclass have paid the migration costs already. Although sanctions may increase job search costs some-
what for exempt aliens, a return to their countries of origin would involve new migration costs as well
as job search costs. As long as they can find work here at wages comparable to or better than those
offered in the origin countries, these aliens will remain in the United States.
15. In testimony before the Senate in 1981, Doris Meissner, Acting Commissioner of the INS,
stated, "Certainly, some illegal aliens will go home-not just those lacking the continuous residence
requirement." 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 10.
In February, 1988, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published a report on the
implementation of IRCA. D. MEISSNER & D. PAPADEMETRIOU, THE LEGALIZATION COUNTDOWN:
A THIRD-QUARTER ASSESSMENT (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988) [hereinafter
CARNEGIE REPORT]. Even with optimistic estimates regarding applications still to be received, the
authors predicted that the illegal population, consisting of the 1982-1986 subclass and those eligible
for legalization who did not apply, would be almost twice the size of the legalized population. This
finding led to debates regarding whether to extend the legalization deadline. See The Alien Amnesty
Deadline Should Be Extended, supra note 13; Applebome, The Amnesty Gamble: Immigration Law's
Impact Still Tough to Measure, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1988, § 4, at 4, col. 1.
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1986 illegal entrants. Section 101(a)(3)(A) of the IRCA provides that em-
ployers do not have to check work authorization for any person hired
before the enactment of the law.'" Thus, these employees are exempt' 7
from the authorization provisions if they retain the jobs they had when the
IRCA became law.
Most employers will now request work authorization before hiring.'8
Under the present system, it is likely that an employer willing to hire an
unauthorized worker will adjust wages and working conditions downward
to compensate for potential fines. 9 Thus, exempt aliens face the option of
remaining with their pre-1986 employers or accepting substandard terms
offered by those who will hire them despite the threat of sanctions.
In addition, the fact that exempt aliens have built up ties in the United
16. See supra note 10.
17. This Note refers to those in the 1982-1986 subclass as "exempt aliens." These persons are
still unlawfully present in the United States. They are, however, exempt from the work authorization
provisions with regard to one employer only.
18. Cf Emigris Take Risk, Seek Asylum in Large Numbers, L.A. Times, June 24, 1988, pt. I at
2, col. 5. (Central Americans increasingly taking risky step of applying for political asylum as it
becomes more difficult to find work without documentation). But cf Piore, The "Illegal Aliens"
Debate Misses the Boat, WORKING PAPERS FOR A NEW SOCIETY 60 (Mar./Apr. 1978) reprinted in
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., SELECTED READINGS ON UNITED STATES IMMI-
GRATION POLICY AND LAW 39 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter SELECTED READINGS]:
Extralegal immigration seems to reflect the fact that legal immigration quotas don't let in as
many immigrants as the American economy needs ....
Industrial societies seem systematically to generate a variety of jobs that full-time, native-
born workers either reject out of hand or accept only when times are especially hard.
While some employers continue to use illegal alien labor in spite of sanctions, others face increased
administrative costs as a result of the Act. The IRCA creates a great burden on all employers, not
simply those in industries known for hiring undocumented workers. See Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Regulation and Business Opportunities of the House Committee on Small Business, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1987) (testimony of Virginia Thomas, attorney, U.S. Chamber of Commerce)
(estimating cost of implementing IRCA at $10 per hiring transaction). See also Immigration Reform
and Control Act: Hearings on S. 529 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of
the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1983) (statement of Robert Thompson,
Chairman, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (recommending enforcement targeted at employers who
knowingly violate the law).
19. There is ample evidence that employers are still in the market for unauthorized workers. In
October, a Department of Labor survey found that only one-third of the businesses in the United
States had complied fully with IRCA. Braun & Hernandez, supra note 13. The University of Cali-
fornia at San Diego Center for United States-Mexico Studies, conducting research on compliance,
discovered that some employers are circumventing the law. Some Firms Dodge Law on Immigration,
Study Finds, L.A. Times, Jan. 15, 1988, pt. 1 at 3, col. 1.
Felix Cardona, an attorney for the Center for Immigrants' Rights, also testified that sanctions had
not deterred employers from employing undocumented aliens. Public Hearing on the Impact of Em-
ployer Sanctions in New York, Nov. 2, 1987 (testimony of Felix Cardona, staff attorney, Center for
Immigrants' Rights) (transcript on file at the Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter Cardona Testi-
mony-Employer Sanctions]. Cf D. NORTH & R. MILLER, supra note 14, at 127:
It would be virtually impossible to prevent employers from taking advantage of lower-priced,
sometimes more productive workers who happen to be illegal aliens. Indeed, most employers
using illegals claim they are "better" workers, that is, that they have a higher marginal prod-
uct [which] results from their desperate need of work. In short, without a total police state, we
won't be able to prevent employers from hiring illegals.
See generally Tobar, Immigration Reform Backfires: No Rights for Migrant Workers, THE NATION,
Sept. 19, 1988, at 196 (IRCA, by producing desperate class of workers willing to accept increasingly
substandard wages and working conditions, has created incentives for employers to hire undocumented
workers).
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States renders them more vulnerable than post-1986 entrants.2 ° It may be
impractical or entirely impossible for members of the subclass to return to
their countries of origin. Even if they wished to do so, moreover, unautho-
rized aliens may not be able to pay for transportation home. Voluntary
surrender to the INS is not a viable option, because deportation carries
serious, life-long consequences. Deportation can bar subsequent legal en-
try to the United States,21 result in summary deportation proceedings for
a later attempted illegal re-entry,22 or lead to felony prosecution for a
later illegal re-entry.2" Unwilling to risk deportation by protesting illegal
conditions, exempt employees are particularly unlikely to enforce their
employment rights.2
This Note argues that the IRCA should be amended to allow members
of the 1982-1986 subclass to legalize their status. The IRCA has not
eliminated the illegal workforce, a primary goal of immigration reform.
Instead, exempt aliens have become an even more exploited workforce. 5
To remedy this problem, Congress should change the legalization eligibil-
ity date to November 6, 1986, the date of the IRCA's passage, in order to
allow this vulnerable subclass to clalm the full protection of the nation's
employment laws. The proposed amendment of the IRCA would secure
the goals of immigration reform, including protection of all workers' em-
ployment rights.
Section I examines the origins and purposes of the legalization provi-
sions. It then discusses the compromise that led to the 1982 legalization
eligibility date. Section II explains the reasons that the IRCA, in its pre-
.sent form, will necessarily result in increased employment practice dis-
crimination.2 This discussion includes an examination of the employment
rights of exempt aliens after the IRCA and the ineffectiveness of the law's
anti-discrimination provisions for protection of the 1982-1986 subclass.
Finally, Section III discusses the condition of the exempt alien in the em-
ployment market. This Section, while acknowledging the delicate political
compromise that led to the IRCA, recommends that Congress re-visit its
decision to establish a legalization eligibility date of 1982.
20. The INS recognizes the difficulties of families with some members who qualify for legaliza-
tion and others who do not. Although the INS refused to promulgate an across-the-board rule, it will
consider family situations in deciding whether to grant voluntary departure in lieu of deportation.
Adjustment of Status for Certain Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,205, 16,207 (proposed May 1, 1987).
21. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(16)-(17) (1982).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(0 (1982).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1982).
24. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
25. Corchado & Solis, supra note 14; Kamiya & Kalka, supra note 14; supra text accompanying
note 20. See Brown, Economic Serfdom, 32 BOSTON BAR J., Mar./Apr. 1988, at 14, 14:
There are reliable reports that many forms of enslavement are beginning to proliferate. In one
case, a disguised headhunter confessed that for many months prior to adoption of [IRCA], he
obtained a $100 fee for each illegal alien he succeeded in bringing to employers. The latter
were avid to pay him for obtaining such [exempt alien] prizes.
26. For the definition of employment practice discrimination, see infra note 65.
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I. HISTORY OF THE LEGALIZATION PROVISIONS
A. The Select Commission Report
Discussion of the IRCA's legalization provisions did not begin with the
1985 congressional debates on immigration reform. Five years before en-
actment of the IRCA, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy submitted its final report to Congress, recommending that a legali-
zation program be established.27 The Commission emphasized that legali-
zation "should be consistent with U.S. interests" and "should not en-
courage further undocumented migration. '28 The Select Commission
recommended a legalization eligibility date of January 1, 1980.29 The
Commission avoided an earlier cutoff date because such a date "would
permit the participation of too few undocumented/illegal aliens, leaving
the United States with a substantial underclass still in illegal status
.... ))'o On the other hand, the Commission did not select an eligibility
date later than the release of its report, fearing that such a recommenda-
tion would encourage increased illegal immigration. 1 The Commission
also refused to suggest a specific length of residency requirement. Unable
to predict how quickly the legislature would act, the Commissioners be-
lieved that Congress would be better equipped to set the residency re-
quirement.32 The Commission did offer guidelines for determining the
term of years required, recommending that Congress "balance[] the desire
for incorporating a substantial number of undocumented/illegal aliens
into U.S. society with the necessity of limiting that participation to those
who have acquired some equity in this country." '3
Congress, in passing the IRCA, did not adequately balance these two
competing interests. The 1982 legalization date effectively imposed a four
year residency requirement that prevented a large portion of the undocu-
mented population from incorporating into the mainstream. Consequently,
a substantial underclass remains in the United States in contradiction of
Congress' original goals of immigration reform.
B. Legalization of Status
Given the desirability of eliminating the category of people working in
the United States without legal protection," Congress included legaliza-
27. U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY, supra note 7, at 72. Public Law No. 95-412 established the
Commission, with duties that included the submission of a report to Congress evaluating existing
immigration laws and policies and the proposal of legislative and administrative amendments. Act of
Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 4(d), 92 Stat. 907, 908.
28. U.S. IMMIGRATION PoLIcY, supra note 7, at 75.
29. Id. at 76.
30. Id. at 77.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 78.
33. Id.
34. Cf. 1985 H.R. REP. 682, supra note 5, at 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
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tion provisions in its immigration reform legislation. Legalization appli-
cants had to submit evidence to the INS proving identity, continuous resi-
dence prior to 1982, and means of financial support. 5 Aliens who
qualified for legalization received authorization to work in this country.
Legalization was designed to complement employer sanctions in elimi-
nating the illegal workforce in the United States. 6 Some legislators
viewed legalization as the only just and effective way to remove the large
class of undocumented workers living here. Congress accepted the Select
Commission's finding that "[a]ttempts at massive deportation would be
destructive of U.S. liberties, costly, likely to be challenged in the courts
and, in the end, ineffective." 3  In addition, some members of Congress felt
that the presence of undocumented workers resulted in large part from the
action (or inaction) of the United States government itself.38
Witnesses also testified repeatedly that undocumented workers appeal
to employers precisely because they will not report working conditions
and employment arrangements that violate federal and state statutes.39
Representative Rodino summed up the vulnerable position of the undocu-
mented worker: "[U]ndocumented persons must keep all contacts with
governmental authorities to an absolute minimum . . . . When their em-
ployer short changes them or doesn't pay them for overtime, or pays them
less than minimum wage, they will complain to no one." 40
Members of Congress realized that the existence of a shadow popula-
tion and a subterranean economy"1 is harmful to both legal workers and
aliens unlawfully present in the United States. Some witnesses and legis-
lators maintained that the presence of undocumented workers leads to
MIN. NEws at 5653 (legalization "would allow qualified aliens to contribute openly to society and it
would help to prevent the exploitation of this vulnerable population in the work place").
35. Adjustment of Status for Certain Aliens, 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d) (1988).
36. See infra note 49.
37. U.S. IMMIGRATION PoLicy, supra note 7, at 73; see 1985 H.R. REp. 682, supra note 5, at
49, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5653 ("[Attempting mass deportations
would be . . . costly, ineffective, and inconsistent with our immigrant heritage.").
38. For example, the Texas proviso of the INA exempted employers from penalties for harboring
aliens. See supra note 10. In addition, the Bracero program legitimized the use of foreign labor in
agriculture. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY,
supra note 7, at 74:
Some Commissioners also believe that legalization would acknowledge that the United States
has at least some responsibility for the presence of undocumented/illegal aliens in this country
.... Some Commissioners also argue that because of that partial responsibility, the alterna-
tives to legalization-continuing largely to ignore undocumented/illegal aliens or initiating
mass deportation efforts-would, apart from being harmful to the United States, constitute
unfair penalties on aliens and their families.
39. See, e.g., 1985 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 64 (testimony of Thomas R. Donahue,
Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO); at 76 (statement of Archbishop (then Bishop) Anthony J. Bevilac-
qua); at 93 (statement of Dale De Haan, Director, Church of World Service).
40. 132 CONG. REc. H9709 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
41. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. S11,429 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1985) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
("There is no question [that] there is a subterranean economy with extraordinary exploitation and all
the implications that has for our own society.").
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higher unemployment.42 The United States Catholic Conference, in a pre-
pared statement, observed that "competition is indirect, as when aliens
willingly accept the wages and conditions offered by employers [which]
domestic workers, with their higher expectations, do not or believe they
cannot accept."" Many employers prefer to hire undocumented workers
because it costs more to hire a legal employee, who will not hesitate to
invoke her employment rights; this results in increased unemployment for
authorized workers.4" Althea Simmons, Director of the Washington Bu-
reau of the NAACP, testified that "particularly in large cities, . . . the
undocumented worker impacts the employment of blacks. . . . [Tihe un-
documented worker . . . is hired at a sub-minimum wage and is at the
mercy of the employer.""' Others maintained that unlawfully present
aliens adversely affect legal workers' wages4e even if the presence of un-
documented workers does not lead to increased unemployment.47 Thus,
concern for the legal rights of authorized workers colored Congress' intent
in passing the IRCA.4"
Supporters of immigration reform argued that stronger border control,
combined with legalization and employer sanctions, would sharply reduce
the number of unauthorized aliens in the country.49 Opponents of legali-
42. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. H9,715 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Smith) (un-
documented workers "are today taking the jobs of Americans and getting paid off the books").
43. 1985 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 82.
44. Undocumented workers are attractive because they are a docile workforce too frightened to
report employment law violations. Legalization, by eliminating the illegal status of certain aliens,
created a less attractive workforce.
For a discussion of the inadequacy of sanctions in deterring such employment, see supra note 18.
45. 1985 H. REP. 682(I), supra note 5, at 47, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 5651.
46. Some experts theorize that the presence of undocumented aliens harms unskilled, low income
laborers while benefitting skilled workers with higher income. See, e.g., Wachter, The Labor Market
and Illegal Immigration, 3 INDUS. AND LAB. REL. REV. 342, 351 (1986), reprinted in SELECTED
READINGS, supra note 18, at 21 (arguing that presence of illegal aliens harms domestic unskilled
workers); Chiswick, Illegal Immigration and Immigration Control, 2 J. ECoN. PERSP. 101, 106-107
(1988) (citation omitted):
The entry into the labor force of additional low-skilled workers . . . depresses the marginal
productivity of all low-skilled workers [which] generally translates into lower wages. However,
it may also lead to a decrease in the employment of native workers ....
The increased immigration of low-skilled workers will lead to an increase in the marginal
productivity and hence the wage rate of higher-skilled workers and the return on capital ....
[Tihe losses to native low-skilled labor are more than offset by the gains to native high-skilled
labor and capital.
A recent General Accounting Office report confirms this theory. GAO, INFLUENCE OF ILLEGAL
ALIENS, supra note 4 at 19. 27.
47. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
48. Cf. U.S. IMMIGRATION PoLicy, supra note 7, at 72: "The costs to society of permitting a
large group of persons to live in illegal, second-class status are enormous. Society is harmed every time
an undocumented alien is afraid to . . . disclose a violation of U.S. labor laws."
49. Senator Kennedy stated, "ITIhe fundamental principle upon which this legislation has always
been based . . . requir[es] that we move simultaneously on: First, the new enforcement provisions;
second, implementation of employer sanctions; and third, the institution of a legalization program."
131 CONG. REC. S11,428 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1985).
Increased enforcement was considered essential. As Senator Simpson observed, "Legalization in the
absence of more effective enforcement is very likely to increase the illegal flow." 131 CONG. REC.
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zation argued, however, that granting legal status to undocumented aliens
would hinder enforcement by encouraging further illegal immigration.
The opposition also regarded legalization as a reward for those who had
broken the law.5 The outcome of this political stalemate, a 1982 legaliza-
tion date, failed to "wipe the slate clean,"51 a necessary element of immi-
gration reform.
Although some legislators52 and many witnesses observed that a 1982
date for legalization eligibility would still leave a substantial subclass who
would not qualify,53 opposition to a later date was strong enough to over-
come those arguments. As the following Section illustrates, the acceptance
of the 1982 date and of legalization itself was the result of an intricate but
ultimately destructive political compromise."
Although politically expedient, the compromise produced a law which
cannot fulfill one of its own purposes: namely, the elimination of the vul-
nerable status of undocumented employees whose position in the labor
force adversely affects legal workers' employment conditions. The combi-
nation of a 1982 legalization date and the imposition of employer sanc-
tions in 198651 created the fatal flaw in IRCA. Legislators made a critical
error in either assuming that most of the exempt subclass would leave
after the implementation of employer sanctions or ignoring the issue alto-
Sll,429 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1985). See supra note 6 for a discussion of increased appropriations for
enforcement.
50. 132 CONG. REc. H9727 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Daub).
51. 131 CONG. REC. S11,428 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1985) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("As we
institute new enforcement policies, legalization allows us to wipe the slate clean, to deal humanely and
responsibly with the problems of the past as we begin to deal more effectively with future illegal
migration."); see also 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 33 (testimony of Michael Teitelbaum,
Program Officer, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation) (legalization seen as way to eliminate social under-
class); 1985 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 94 (statement of Dale DeHaan, Director, Church of
World Service) (intent of legalization program, "to wipe the slate clean," requires later cutoff date).
52. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., 1985 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 57 (testimony of Thomas R. Donahue,
Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO) (urging eligibility date of one year before enactment); at 74 (state-
ment of Archbishop Bevilacqua) (proposing cutoff date of 1983); at 88 (statement of Hyman Book-
binder, Representative of the American Jewish Comm.) (same); at 94 (statement of Dale De Haan,
Director, Church of World Service) (suggesting more current cutoff); at 99 (joint statement of Inter-
national Jewish Migration Agency and Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service) (same); at 118
(statement of National Council of La Raza) (recommending date of 1983); at 160 (statement of
NAACP) (supporting eligibility as of date of enactment).
54. One commentator noted that "[slupporters of [IRCA] were also aided by. . .the weariness of
some of the bill's opponents. Hispanics and business representatives, believing passage was inevitable,
devoted their efforts to tailor the legislation more to their liking." Comment, The United States Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act of 1986: A Critical Perspective, 8 Nw. J. INt'L L. & Bus. 503,
503 n.l (1987) (citations omitted).
Doris Meissner, former Acting Commissioner of the INS, noted that the IRCA "resulted from a
political compromise, not a real analysis, and we'll have to live with the deficiencies of that ap-
proach." Applebome, Amnesty for Aliens: The Curtain Rings Down to Some Mixed Reviews, N.Y.
Times, May 7, 1988, § 1, at 7, col. 1.
55. Concerns regarding the effect of the law on American businesses and authorized workers
motivated the IRCA's prospective application. See, e.g., 1985 H.R. REP. 682, supra note 5, at 56,
reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5660 ("The Committee felt [prospective
application] would be the least disruptive to the American businessman and would also minimize the
possibility of employment discrimination.").
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gether.5 6 Instead, exempt aliens remained in the United States,57 unpro-
tected against employer abuse. For this reason, Congress should re-
examine the legalization eligibility cutoff.
C. Congressional Consideration of the Legalization Date
The legislative debates surrounding the IRCA reflect the intensity of
disagreement regarding the appropriate date for legalization eligibility.58
In 1984, the House considered a predecessor bill to H.R. 3080, which
became the IRCA. When faced with attempts to restrict eligibility, many
representatives supported the House committee's proposed date of 1982.
Congressman Rodino argued:
If we do not preserve the legalization formula in the committee bill,
we will be condemning unknown millions of hard-working, law-
abiding people-and their children-to an inhumane existence, with
the constant dread of discovery and the protection of our laws denied
them.5"
Yet, as Congress reconsidered immigration reform in subsequent years,
the legalization eligibility date did not change. In 1983, the Senate immi-
gration bill had an eligibility date of 1980.6' In 1985, the Senate bill still
went to conference with a date of 19 80 ,6i despite the fact that two more
years had passed with aliens entering the country illegally. Those who
opposed the early eligibility date were forced to accept 1982 or risk jeop-
ardizing legalization altogether.6" The IRCA's supporters believed that
the existence of the exempt subclass was less objectionable than the pas-
sage of employer sanctions without any legalization provision.13 The exis-
tence of substantial political opposition 4 to any type of legalization pro-
gram increased the pressure to compromise.
56. 132 CONG. REc. H9715 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
57. See supra note 15.
58. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REc. H6032-60 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (debate surrounding amend-
ment proposed by Rep. Lungren).
59. Id. at H6043.
60. S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1983).
61. S. REP. 132, supra note 4, at 15.
62. See supra note 54.
63. Senator Kennedy, a proponent of a later eligibility date, observed:
This legalization program makes sense from a practical point of view. It is really the most
practical way that we can take a subclass, limited certainly, as I have pointed out in earlier
debates, but at least a part of the subclass of undocumented aliens, and bring them into the
mainstream of American life ....
129 CONG. REc. S6723 (daily ed. May 16, 1983) (emphasis added).
Senator Kennedy supported a generous and flexible legalization program. S. REP. 132, supra note
4, at 103 (minority view of Mr. Kennedy). See also 131 CONG. REc. S11,428 (daily ed. Sept. 13,
1985) ("[Tihe only sensible way to deal with this issue is to follow the Select Commission's recom-
mendation that we move simultaneously on new enforcement strategies at the same time we also clean
up the mess current law has created in a large population of undocumented aliens.").
64. Representative McCollum summed up the argument against legalization, citing four reasons
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II. EXEMPT EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE
DISCRIMINATION
65
This section examines the vulnerability of exempt workers and the pos-
sibility of increased employer violation of labor laws. The first subsection
analyzes the IRCA's anti-discrimination provisions, which redress only
hiring discrimination. The next subsection develops an analogy between
exempt employees and the highly exploited Bracero6 workers, illustrating
that exempt employees are especially vulnerable to employment practice
discrimination. The third subsection examines how unlawfully present
aliens are chilled from enforcing their employment rights.
A. The Limited Scope of the IRCA's Anti-Discrimination Provisions
Anticipating the effect that employer sanctions might have on author-
ized workers who look or sound foreign, 7 the IRCA includes anti-
discrimination provisions68 to address potential increased discrimination in
hiring. While denying that the IRCA would lead to wholesale discrimina-
tion in hiring without such provisions," the House Judiciary Committee
emphasized that it had taken "every effort . . to minimize the potential-
"170ity of discrimination ....
for his opposition. First, amnesty "would be a slap in the face to the millions who have stood in line
around the world for years waiting to come to this country legally." Second, legalization would act as
a magnet for future illegal migration. Third, the proposed law would result in a great distortion in
immigration patterns, with certain regions of the world getting more than their proportional share of
immigrants to the United States. Finally, legalization would lead to increased costs to taxpayers. 130
CONG. REC. H6044 (daily ed. June 19, 1984).
65. Employment practice discrimination is an employer's systematic imposition of substandard
terms on a particular group of workers.
66. "Braceros" were temporary agricultural workers imported from Mexico. See infra text ac-
companying notes 78-79.
67. The IRCA's legislative history contains substantial discussion of the potential for increased
hiring discrimination as a result of sanctions. Alien Adjustment and Employment Act, 1977: Hear-
ings on S. 2252 before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1978) (testimony
of Vilma Martinez, president of Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund
(MALDEF)); 1985 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 64 (testimony of Thomas Donahue, Secretary-
Treasurer, AFL-CIO). See also 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 81 (National Council of La
Raza Report, attachment B) (sanctions will have adverse impact on hiring decisions affecting His-
panic and other "foreign-looking" workers). But see Anti-Discrimination Provision of H.R. 3080:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 208 (1985) (testimony of Paul Grossman, attorney and co-author,
Emplo)ment Discrimination Law) (IRCA will not create substantial alienage discrimination).
68. The IRCA established legal redress for hiring discrimination that might result from employer
sanctions. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) states that it is an unfair immigration-related employment practice
"to discriminate against any individual (other than an unauthorized alien) with respect to the hiring
... of the individual for employment . . . because of such individual's national origin or . . .be-
cause of such individual's citizenship status." 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (subsection letters omitted).
For a discussion of the effectiveness of these provisions, see Comment, IRCA's Anti-Discrimination
Provisions: Protection Against Hiring Discrimination in Private Employment, 25 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 405 (1988) (interaction of Title VII, Section 1981, and IRCA will protect likely discriminatees).
69. 1985 H.R. REP. 682, supra note 5, at 68, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5672.
70. Id.
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As a result of these efforts, section 102 of the IR0A 1 broadens Title
VII's coverage of national origin discrimination and outlaws discrimina-
tion based on citizenship status." The IRCA also empowers a special
counsel to consider alleged violations of these provisions, 4 but Congress
also has clearly stated that section 102 does not in any way restrict the
powers of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission." Finally,
the IRCA creates a taskforce to monitor the effects of the law on patterns
of discrimination and to initiate legislative retraction upon a finding of
widespread discrimination.""
These provisions protect authorized workers. The Act does not address
the problem of employment practice discrimination aimed at unlawfully
present aliens. As the next subsection illustrates, exempt workers are par-
ticularly vulnerable to such discrimination.7
B. Exempt Employees and Migrant Workers: An Analogy
The position of exempt employees is analogous to that of the migrant
workers under the Bracero program. 8 That program led to "widespread
abuse of both braceros and 'illegal' Mexican workers, who in some cases
became virtual slaves."79 Braceros were bound by contract to a specific
farm and could not work legally for any other employer.
Exempt employees are in a similar situation. While able to continue
working without authorization for employers who hired them before No-
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (Supp. IV 1986).
72. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies only to those businesses with 15 or more
employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). The IRCA covers all those employing more than three
people. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). Cf Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86
(1973) (Section 703 of Title VII does not apply to citizenship-based discrimination).
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
76. The IRCA requires the Comptroller General to report to Congress annually for three years
on the results of the implementation of the law. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(j)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). A joint
taskforce, consisting of the Attorney General, the chair of the Commission on Civil Rights, and the
chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is responsible for reviewing the report. 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(k)(l) (Supp. IV 1986). If the Comptroller General makes a determination that the
IRCA has resulted in a pattern of discrimination in employment, the task force must recommend
appropriate legislation. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(k)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). If both houses of Congress enact a
joint resolution approving the discrimination finding within 30 days of the report's issuance, employer
sanctions will terminate. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(l)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). IRCA outlines expedited proce-
dures in the House and Senate for consideration of this matter. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(m),(n).
Another attempt to monitor legal employment relationships is the requirement that the President
report annually to Congress for three years on the implementation of the work authorization provi-
sions, analyzing the impact of those provisions on "the employment, wages, and working conditions of
United States workers and on the economy of the United States." IRCA § 402(3)(A).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 80-82.
78. The Bracero program began in 1942, pursuant to a treaty with Mexico, as a temporary
wartime measure to provide United States farmers with Mexican laborers. The program continued
until 1951 through a series of agreements between the United States and Mexico. Congress estab-
lished the program by statute in 1951. An Act to Amend the Agriculture Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 78,
65 Stat. 119 (1951). On May 29, 1963, Congress terminated the Bracero program.
79. J. COCKCROFT, OUTLAWS IN THE PROMIsED LAND 68 (1986).
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vember 6, 1986, exempt aliens cannot provide adequate documentation for
a new job,80 because after the IRCA, most new employers offering stan-
dard employment terms will demand to see work authorization." Agen-
cies that work with the undocumented population have already received
reports of employer attempts to profit from this immobility. The Center
for Immigrants' Rights in New York has received phone calls from ex-
empt employees who have not been paid for months, because their em-
ployers know that they will not risk deportation by looking for new jobs.82
The IRCA also included an amendment revising the temporary
farmworker program (H-2A program)". The debate surrounding H-2A
workers demonstrates the legislature's cognizance of the possibility of un-
acceptable wages and living conditions resulting from such employment
immobility." The spirited congressional discussion of the H-2A program
centered on whether it would ultimately deteriorate, just as the Bracero
program had.85 For example, Representative Gonzalez argued that the
new program "guarantees that those who want to exploit cheap, foreign
labor on farms and ranches can continue to do so with impunity.""6 Rep-
resentative Panetta argued in opposition that the program would result in
higher employment standards. He saw the choice as "protecting [tihe ex-
isting system, where we have uncontrolled borders, employers who easily
can exploit, workers who can easily be exploited . . .versus a reform bill
80. As a consequence of the IRCA, employers have taken advantage of vulnerable unauthorized
aliens by imposing six- and seven-day work weeks, refusing to pay for labor, cutting wages while
increasing hours and abusing their employees physically and sexually. Corchado & Solis, supra note
14. For a description of existing illegal employment practices in New York City's garment industry,
see Freitag, New York is Fighting Spread of Sweatshops, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1987 at Al, col. 2.
The General Accounting Office recently released a report documenting the resurgence of sweatshops
in the garment, restaurant and meat processing industries. Experts attribute this development, in part,
to the "large number of immigrants, both legal and illegal, [which] has created a sizable and trained
pool of workers who are easily exploited." Investigators Find Sweatshops Are in Resurgence, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 4, 1988, at A26, col. 1. See also 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 209 (statement
of International Ladies Garment Workers Union) (presence of undocumented workers linked to rapid
growth of sweatshops in garment industry).
81. See Arocha, supra note 14.
82. See Cardona testimony-Employer Sanctions, supra note 19.
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1186 (Supp. IV 1986). This program makes temporary migrant labor available
where no domestic workers are willing to perform the job. Some argue that the claim of domestic
labor shortages is fictitious and such a program is unnecessary. See Chavez Steps up Fight on Foreign
Labor, L.A. Times, pt. 1 at 2, col. 3.
84. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. An employer must apply to the Secretary of
Labor for certification to hire temporary workers. The Secretary may deny the application if the
employer has violated a material term of past certification. In addition, the Secretary will not issue
certification when there is a strike or a lockout. 8 U.S.C. § l186(b)(Supp. IV 1986). Thus, the
Secretary polices employer compliance with relevant employment laws.
85. See, e.g., 1985 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 88 (statement of Hyman Bookbinder, D.C.
Representative of the American Jewish Comm.) ("temporary labor arrangements deteriorate all too
easily into exploitative relationships"); at 129 (statement of Richard P. Fajardo, Acting Assoc. Coun-
sel, Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund) (temporary farmworker program provisions to protect
labor rights "unenforceable due to the leverage growers had over farmworkers"); S. REP. 132, supra
note 4, at 108 (minority views of Mr. Simon) (citing problems with Bracero program).
86. 132 CONG. REc. H10,588 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986).
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that tries to correct those concerns."87 Given the similarity between the
expanded guestworker provisions and the infamous Bracero program, the
Committee reporting on H.R. 3080 had to distinguish its new proposal.
Mobility was the distinguishing factor. The House Judiciary Commit-
tee stated that there were two essential elements for any new guestworker
program. "First, the workers must be free to move from employer to em-
ployer without risk of negative repercussions. And second, the workers
must be fully protected8 under all federal, state and local labor laws."'
One Representative summed up the importance of the ability to change
employers:
[I]t gives the growers their supply of labor, but what it also does is,
it says: "Laborer, if that grower decides not to give you a toilet, not
to give you running water, to pay you 90 cents an hour, you are no
longer stuck . . . . You can, in a sense, vote with your feet." 90
The exempt subclass does not enjoy that mobility. Formally, exempt
aliens have "mobility" and are fully protected by employment law. As a
practical matter, however, these guarantees are illusory.
C. Statutory Employment Rights of Aliens: The Problem of Enforcement
Exempt employees retain formal employment rights,91 but the passage
of the IRCA will affect the likelihood of the enforcement of those rights.
In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,9 the Supreme Court held that undocu-
mented workers are covered by the National Labor Relations Act." The
Court recognized that congressional attempts to secure minimum standard
terms of employment required the application of the NLRA to all work-
ers. If not protected by the NLRA, undocumented aliens present in the
United States and not subject to standard terms of employment could ad-
versely affect the employment conditions of lawful employees." Similarly,
87. Id. at H10,591.
88. As authorized temporary workers, Braceros technically enjoyed employment protections. In
fact, however, the law was not observed. See supra note 85.
89. 1985 H.R. REP. 682, supra note 5, at 51, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 5655 (footnote added).
90. 132 CONG. REC. H9724 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Schumer).
91. Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1988), rev'g Patel v. Sumani Corp., 660 F.
Supp. 1528 (N.D. Ala. 1987) (after IRCA, Fair Labor Standards Act continues to cover unlawfully
present aliens). See also Comment, Protection for Undocumented Workers Under the FLSA: An
Evaluation in Light of IRCA, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 379 (1988).
92. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
93. National Labor Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
151-169). Although protected by the NLRA, undocumented workers have limited backpay remedies.
See Casenote, Rights Without a Remedy-Illegal Aliens under the NLRA: Sure-Tan, Inc. and Surak
Leather Co. v. NLRB, 27 B.C.L. REv. 407 (1986); Comment, Remedies for Undocumented Workers
Following a Retaliatory Discharge, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 573, 579-80 (1987). But see Hernandez
v. M/V Rajaan, 848 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1988) (injured undocumented longshoreman entitled to dam-
ages based on future wages in United States since he planned to stay).
94. 467 U.S. at 892:
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courts have construed laws protecting migrant farmworkers"5 to protect
undocumented workers as well. 96 Analogously, the Occupational Safety
and Health Act9" and the Fair Labor Standards Act9 should cover unau-
thorized employees." Those who fall into the exempt category benefit
from such protections, if willing to enforce the law.
Realistically, however, exempt undocumented workers will be reluctant
to invoke these laws."' 0 In framing the IRCA, Congress failed to address
the problem of the immobility of easily silenced exempt employees. At this
time, it appears that the exempt workers will remain in the United States
and continue to work."' For this reason, the Act necessarily encourages
employment practice discrimination such as FLSA violations,"0 2 although
exempt aliens are technically protected. Members of the exempt subclass
cannot "vote with their feet."103 The IRCA offers no protection to exempt
employees vulnerable to abuse after the passage of sanctions.
If undocumented alien employees were excluded from participation in union activities and
from protections against employer intimidation, there would be created a subclass of workers
without a comparable stake in the collective goals of their legally resident co-workers, thereby
eroding the unity of all the employees and impeding effective collective bargaining.
95. See, e.g., Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-470, 96
Stat. 2583 (1982).
96. See, e.g., In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1987) (Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act applicable to citizens and aliens alike and whether alien is undocumented is
irrelevant).
97. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1982) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 5, 7, 9, 15, 20, 29, 42, 43 U.S.C.).
98. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219).
99. North, Labor Market Rights of Foreign-Born Workers, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1982, at
32, 33, quoted in Casenote, supra note 93, at 444.
100. Cf. E. GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR 223-27 (1964), which explains deterrents to the
braceros' organization for better employment conditions. In a position analogous to the braceros, the
exempt subclass will have many of the same reasons for remaining silent.
It is also possible that some lower courts outside the Eleventh Circuit will further deter undocu-
mented workers from enforcing their labor rights by following the Patel district court's reasoning:
"Since the employment relationship between an employer and an undocumented alien is hence not
illegal under the INA, there is no reason to conclude that application of the NLRA to employment
practices affecting such aliens would necessarily conflict with the terms of the INA." 660 F. Supp. at
1532 (quoting Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 893). Indeed, an employer in California has used similar rea-
soning as a defense to a charge of sex discrimination. The case will be heard in April of 1989. Tobar,
supra note 19, at 196.
101. Arocha, supra note 14.
In Congressional hearings on the 1990 census, Mayor Edward I. Koch of New York testified that
many undocumented aliens have remained, despite their ineligibility for legalization. See Impact of
Legalization Process on Counting Undocumented Aliens in Decennial Census: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Census and Population of the Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1987). Mayor Koch observed that the 1982 legalization date created this shadow popula-
tion. Id. at 9-10. In holding these hearings, Congress acknowledged that a large class of undocu-
mented aliens remain in this country in spite of IRCA.
102. See Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d at 704. ("Employers might find it economically advan-
tageous to hire and underpay undocumented workers and run the risk of sanctions under the
IRCA."). But see Tobar, supra note 19, at 198 (some Latino workers in California have successfully
organized to ensure standard wages and working conditions).
103. See supra text accompanying note 90.
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III. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT
Congress should act immediately to amend the IRCA for three reasons.
First, the legalization provisions, in creating an exempt subclass, com-
pletely undermine a primary goal of immigration reform. Instead of elimi-
nating a vulnerable shadow population, the IRCA simply pushes it fur-
ther underground. Second, the considerations that led Congress to adopt a
1982 eligibility date are no longer valid. Third, the existence of the ex-
empt subclass conflicts with the goals of federal employment policy. This
Section discusses the rationale for an amendment that would change the
date of eligibility to November 6, 1986.1'"
A. The Failure of Sanctions and 1982 Legalization
Given the ineffectiveness of employer sanctions,"' 5 the 1982 legalization
date defeats a significant goal of immigration reform-the removal of a
vulnerable subclass in the U.S. labor market. The 1982 date disqualified
large numbers of aliens already settled in the United States at the time of
the IRCA's passage. In addition, the legalization program, plagued with
problems from its inception, 0 6 probably discouraged qualified individuals
from applying.107 The number of undocumented aliens who applied for
legalization of status fell significantly below INS projections. Further, em-
ployer sanctions have not eliminated the incentives to hire members of the
1982-1986 subclass. Therefore, to accomplish one important goal of re-
form, Congress must revise the compromise date to November 6, 1986,
thus eliminating a vulnerable subclass. This narrowly tailored proposal is
designed only to address the problem of exempt aliens subclass. For this
reason, similar amendments will not be necessary in future years.
As time passes, the concerns that motivated opponents of a later eligibil-
ity date become less valid. When Congress began serious consideration of
104. This Note does not propose a 1988 date, which would be inconsistent with the purposes of
the IRCA. An amendment revising the eligibility date to 1986 will achieve an important goal of the
IRCA: the elimination of a vulnerable class of workers that existed at the time of the law's passage.
An eligibility date of 1988 might encourage people to enter the country illegally hoping for another
legalization program in two years. Such a result would clearly undermine immigration reform.
105. For a discussion of why sanctions fail to deter illegal employment, see Comment, Employer
Sanctions for Hiring Illegal Aliens: A Simplistic Solution to a Complex Problem, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 203, 204-205 (1984). For an examination of the failure of sanctions in other countries, see
generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GGD 82-86, INFORMATION ON THE ENFORCE-
MENT OF LAWS REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (1982). See
also supra note 80.
106. Meissner and Papademetriou cited the following problems: inadequate dissemination of in-
formation, shifts in policy, slow application processing, and confusing directions from volunteer immi-
grant assistance agencies. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 15, at viii-xvi.
107. Id. INS' initial efforts were marked by confusion and constant policy changes. See Debate
Continues on Alien Deadline Extension, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1988, § 12, at 10, col. 3 (New
Jersey). [hereinafter Debate Continues]. As the INS gained experience with legalization, however, the
program ran more smoothly. The INS could use this experience to re-implement legalization for the
1982-1986 subclass, without duplicating the same problems.
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immigration reform in 1980, many legislators did not want to encourage
increased illegal immigration while considering amnesty."' 8 The proposed
amendment does not raise such concerns. Since only those who can prove
they were here before November 6, 1986 will qualify, an amendment at
this time would not stimulate further illegal immigration. The opponents
of a later date also argued that only long-term residents should qualify.'0 9
This Note's proposal would require that aliens reside in the United States
for at least the last two years.
Congress did not want to reward those who entered the country, upon
hearing of the passage of a legalization program, with resident status. Al-
though this amendment would allow some unlawfully present aliens to
become legal residents, this is not a "reward." Instead, this amendment,
like the original legalization program, would represent a commitment to
the elimination of substandard employment terms in the United States.
The proposed amendment will simply realize the IRCA's original goals
more fully by legitimizing the status of aliens who will remain in the
United States and continue to work here.
B. The Need to Override the Compromise
This Note proposes that the legalization date, motivated by political
considerations, must be amended to reflect circumstances either unforeseen
or unacknowledged by members of Congress. Political expediency led to
the adoption of the 1982 eligibility date." 0 Opponents of the 1982 date
were forced to accept the creation of the exempt subclass or receive no
legalization program at all.
The situation created by the IRCA conflicts with the goals of a large
body of federal and state employment and labor law designed to protect
workers."' A primary motivation for immigration reform was the desire
to eliminate the adverse impact of unauthorized employment on that pol-
icy." 2 Since the existence of the exempt subclass is a threat to the estab-
108. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. H9727 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Daub).
109. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. H10,584 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Rodino)
(legalization does not reward aliens who have been in United States for only short period of time). See
also 1985 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 4 (testimony of Edwin Meese III) ("people, having
entered this country illegally a substantial number [of] years ago, have set down roots here and be-
come productive members of American society"); at 10 (statement of Rep. Mazzoli) (endorsing long-
term resident legalization provision).
110. See supra note 54.
111. These laws include the Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 7, 9, 15, 20, 29, 42, 43 U.S.C.); National Labor Relations
Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codifed as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169); Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 171-187);
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15).
112. See 1985 H.R. REP. 682, supra note 5, at 47, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 5651 (quoting NAACP testimony on "starvation" labor conditions imposed in un-
documented worker market); 1985 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 171 (testimony of Althea
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lishment of minimum standard employment conditions in the United
States, a 1986 legalization date is necessary for truly successful immigra-
tion reform.
Although the application deadline has passed, 3 if Congress acts
quickly, the INS will be able to use resources developed for the original
legalization program. Pursuant to the IRCA, the Attorney General and
the INS spent six months promulgating regulations to create the infra-
structure required for legalization. 1 " With legalization experience ac-
quired already and regulations in place, the INS should be able to re-
implement the program relatively efficiently.
IV. CONCLUSION
In passing the IRCA with a 1982 eligibility date, Congress compro-
mised away meaningful immigration reform. Congress will not achieve
the goals of immigration reform if it does not change the legalization eligi-
bility date. A substantial underclass still remains in our society because of
the 1982 cutoff date. Indeed, the IRCA has simply exacerbated the prob-
lem of a subterranean employment market.
Many members of the exempt subclass have remained in the United
States, undermining an important goal of the IRCA. This Note argues
that the effect of this subclass on the employment market justifies congres-
sional reconsideration of the legalization eligibility cutoff. Should Con-
gress choose not to act, we must acknowledge the price of that inaction as
we "live with the deficiencies""' 5 of the IRCA's compromise.
Simmons).
113. Congress considered extending the application deadline to November 30, 1988. A Senate
filibuster killed the bill. See Debate Continues, supra note 107.
114. IRCA § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(g) (Supp. IV 1986).
115. Applebome, supra note 54 (quoting Doris Meissner, former Acting Commissioner, INS).
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